

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00  
COME-00 EB-08 FRB-03 INR-10 NSAE-00 SP-02 STR-07  
TRSE-00 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01 AGRE-00 DODE-00  
PM-05 H-01 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01 SS-15 ICA-11 DOE-15  
SOE-02 /123 W

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R 142000Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7889  
INFO ALL EC CAPITALS  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 13878

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E.O.11652: GDS  
TAGS: EAID, EEC, MIDEAST  
SUBJECT: EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE: EC COMMISSION WORKING LEVEL  
REFLECTS ON PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND SUGGESTS  
TROUBLESOME FUTURE DIRECTIONS

REF: (A) 77 BRUSSELS 15396, (B) BRUSSELS 5794

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. WHEN THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE WAS LAUNCHED AT THE DECEMBER, 1973, EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN COPENHAGEN, IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT THE EC-NINE AND MEMBERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE WOULD ESTABLISH A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" MANIFESTING ITSELF ACROSS A BROAD FRONT OF ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, TECHNICAL AND OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION, EVEN INCLUDING ENERGY. LATER, IN 1974, ENERGY (I.E., SUPPLY AND PRICING OF PETROLEUM) WAS DROPPED AS A SUBJECT IN THE  
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DIALOGUE. FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, SINCE 1976, WHEN THE SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF THE DIALOGUE WAS LAUNCHED, PROGRESS IN BUILDING CLOSER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TIES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DIALOGUE HAS BEEN LIMITED. (REFTELS). FROM THE EC'S VIEWPOINT, ITS ARAB INTERLOCUTORS HAVE SPENT TOO MUCH TIME TRYING TO ELEVATE THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE DIALOGUE AT THE EXPENSE

OF THE ECONOMIC AND ARE, MOREOVER, GENERALLY TOO DIFFUSE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY TO PERMIT RESPONSIVE, CO-ORDINATED PROGRESS. SEEN FROM THE ARAB SIDE, EC-NINE UNWILLINGNESS TO MOVE VERY FAR ON POLITICAL ISSUES, (ALTHOUGH THE NINE CONSIDER THEIR DECLARATION OF JUNE 29, 1977 TO HAVE BEEN A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION) AS WELL AS THE EC'S UNWILLINGNESS TO GUARANTEE ARAB INVESTMENTS IN EUROPE AGAINST MONETARY RISKS AND TO AGREE TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR ALL THE ARAB STATES, ARE CONSIDERED OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVEMENT IN THE DIALOGUE. WHILE ADDITIONAL FACTORS ARE AT STAKE ON BOTH SIDES, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT FOR MANY THE DIALOGUE HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS ORIGINAL PROMISE. SOME IN THE EC (AND, WE ARE TOLD, AT LEAST THE SAUDI ARABIANS AMONG THE ARABS) ARE SEEKING WAYS TO REVITALIZE THE DIALOGUE AND, IN THIS CONNECTION, ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR PRESENTATION TO THE NEXT MEETING OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE, NOW SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER IN DAMASCUS. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS IDEAS WHICH HAVE BEEN DRAFTED AT THE EC COMMISSION STAFF LEVEL FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMISSION, COREPER, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EC MEMBER STATES MEETING IN POLITICAL COOPERATION. MANY OF THESE IDEAS ARE CONTROVERSIAL AND HAVE NOT YET BY ANY MEANS WON BROAD ACCEPTANCE IN THE COMMISSION OR AMONG MEMBER STATES, AND WE THINK THERE ARE FORMIDABLE CONSTRAINTS TO THEIR BEING ACCEPTED. NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE THE END RESULT OF THESE INTERLOCKING COMMISSION STAFF PRO-  
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POSALS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO U.S. INTERESTS -- AN INTERNAL COMMISSION MEMORANDUM RECOMMENDS THAT THE EC PROPOSE COMMUNITY PREFERENCES FOR ARAB EXPORTS OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS BEGINNING ABOUT 1982 IN RETURN FOR ARAB ASSURANCES ON SUPPLIES OF CRUDE OIL TO WESTERN EUROPE -- THE MISSION INTENDS, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE CONTRARY, TO DO ITS PART TO HEAD THIS OFF AT THE PASS BY INFORMING SELECTED COMMISSION AND COREPER OFFICIALS THAT THE U.S. WOULD ACTIVELY OPPOSE SUCH COMMISSION STAFF PROPOSALS. END SUMMARY.

2. AN OFFICIAL IN THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF AN EC MEMBER COUNTRY RECENTLY PROVIDED USEC WITH A DRAFT EC COMMISSION MEMORANDUM ENTITLED "EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE: ORIGIN, CURRENT STATUS, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES." THIS MEMORANDUM, PRIMARILY A PRODUCT OF THE COMMISSION'S DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND A FEW WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS IN THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND SOME MEMBER STATE EXPERTS MAY ALSO HAVE DISCUSSED THE PAPER WITH THE COMMISSION STAFF DURING THE DRAFTING STAGE, WAS WRITTEN IN EARLY 1978. WHILE THE DOCUMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY ENDORSED BY THE COMMISSION, OFFICIALS THERE TELL US THAT IT IS ULTIMATELY IN-

TENDED FOR EC-NINE REVIEW -- BOTH BY COREPER AND BY THE  
MEMBER STATES MEETING IN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL CO-  
OPERATION, SINCE THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE IS HANDLED BY THE  
COMMUNITY BOTH WITHIN THE FORMAL EC INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  
AND WITHIN THE NINE'S POLITICAL COOPERATION. IN THIS  
REGARD, WE ARE INFORMED THAT ON JULY 12 AN EC-NINE WORKING  
PARTY WAS TO MEET IN BONN IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL CO-  
OPERATION TO REVIEW THE DOCUMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THE EC  
COMMISSION WILL BEGIN A SIMILAR REVIEW BEGINNING JULY 19.  
THE COMMISSION SERVICES HOPE THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS WILL  
FIND SUFFICIENT FAVOR WITH COREPER AND WITH THE NINE'S  
POLITICAL DIRECTORS THAT THEY WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE EC  
FOREIGN MINISTERS SO THAT IN SEPTEMBER THE MINISTERS CAN  
REVIEW THEM FORMALLY WHILE CONSIDERING A MANDATE FOR THE  
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DIALOGUE'S GENERAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN OCTOBER.

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TRSE-00 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01 AGRE-00 DODE-00  
PM-05 H-01 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01 SS-15 ICA-11 DOE-15  
SOE-02 /123 W

-----047220 151913Z /43

R 142000Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7890

INFO ALL EC CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

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3. MISSION IS TOLD THAT THE VERY BOLDNESS OF THE INNOVATIONS BEING PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION STAFF IN THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE AS REGARDS ENERGY HAS CAUSED THE DOCUMENT TO BE GIVEN A GENERALLY CAUTIOUS RECEPTION THUS FAR WITHIN THE COMMISSION AND IN EC MEMBER STATE CIRCLES. (A SOURCE IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE COMMISSION TOLD US, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WHILE DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONER CHEYSSON IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSALS, COMMISSIONERS DAVIGNON AND HAFERKAMP -- COMMISSIONERS FOR INTERNAL MARKET AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS -- ARE COOL). ON THE OTHER HAND, A DANISH PERM REP OFFICIAL HAS INFORMED US THAT MEMBER STATE INTEREST IN A SERIOUS EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMEHOW INCLUDING ENERGY IN THE DIALOGUE IS GROWING. HE NOTED THAT WHEREAS THE FRENCH WERE THE ONLY ONES ARGUING ALONG THESE LINES TWO YEARS AGO, PERHAPS A MAJORITY OF MEMBER STATES NOW BELIEVE THAT THE DIALOGUE IS UNLIKELY

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TO GO ANYWHERE UNLESS THIS ISSUE IS BROUGHT IN.

4. THE COMMISSION STAFF DRAFT MEMORANDUM (COPIES OF WHICH ARE BEING POUCHED TO EUR/RPE-SALISBURY AND NEA/RA-DOZIER) INITIALLY REVIEWS THE CURRENT STATUS AND PROBLEMS OF THE DIALOGUE. IT THEN: (A) SUGGESTS A STRATEGY FOR "REINVIGORATING" THE DIALOGUE; AND (B) TO THAT END, PRESENTS A NUMBER OF POLICY "OPTIONS," TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PURPORTED MUTUAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

A. PROPOSED STRATEGY TO REVITALIZE THE DIALOGUE: ON THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE IS A "VALID" INTERLOCUTOR FOR THE COMMUNITY BUT THAT THE LEAGUE'S GOALS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE (E.G., RECOGNITION OF THE PLO) CONTINUE TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EC-NINE, THE COMMISSION DRAFT IDENTIFIES THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES OR OBJECTIVES TO "GUIDE" THE FUTURE EFFORTS OF THE TWO SIDES ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF THE DIALOGUE.

THE EC SEEKS:

-- EQUITABLE PARTICIPATION BY EUROPEAN FIRMS IN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF ARAB INDUSTRIES;

-- "COORDINATED" EC-ARAB LONGER-RUN PLANNING OF ARAB PETROCHEMICAL AND OTHER INVESTMENT AND SIMILAR INVESTMENT IN EUROPE, SO AS TO AVOID EXCESS PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY;

-- PARTICIPATION BY ARAB FINANCIAL CAPITAL, UNDER APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS, IN REORGANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF EUROPEAN INDUSTRIES; AND

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-- APPROPRIATE ARAB ASSURANCES REGARDING SUPPLY AND DELIVERY OF CRUDE OIL TO EUROPE.

IN EXCHANGE, EC WOULD OFFER:

-- REASONABLE ACCESS TO EC-NINE MARKETS FOR LIMITED QUANTITIES OF GOODS PRODUCED FROM THE EXPANDING ARAB INDUSTRIAL BASE;

-- STRENGTHENING OF COOPERATION IN KEY AREAS, SUCH AS SECURITY OF INVESTMENTS, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION AND WORKER TRAINING.

B. POLICY OPTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSED STRATEGY: ASSUMING THE FOREGOING "COMPLEMENTARITY" OF INTERESTS ON THE TWO SIDES IS DEEMED VALID, THE DOCUMENT DISCUSSES PRACTICAL STEPS TO FOSTER ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUGGESTED STRATEGY. ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION SERVICES, THE KEY ISSUE IS TO "GUIDE" FUTURE ARAB INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY (WHICH HOPEFULLY WOULD BE A PRODUCT OF GREATER EUROPEAN BUSINESS PARTICIPATION AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILL) THROUGH A JOINT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RESTRUCTURING EFFORT AT THE EURO-ARAB LEVEL. TO WIN ARAB ACCEPTANCE, THE EC COULD AGREE EITHER TO OPEN ITS MARKETS IN SAY, PETRO-CHEMICALS, TO THAT PORTION OF ITS NEEDS UNLIKELY TO BE COVERED BY ITS OWN CURRENT OR FUTURE INVESTMENTS, OR ACCEPT, A PRIORI, THE PRINCIPLE THAT A "REASONABLE" PART OF EC-NINE MARKETS IN THESE SECTORS SHOULD BE CONCEDED TO THE ARAB SUPPLIERS. THE PAPER NOTES THAT THE LATTER OPTION WOULD REQUIRE A POLITICALLY COURAGEOUS COMMITMENT TO "RESTRUCTURE" EUROPEAN INDUSTRY AND THAT ON BALANCE IT IS THE MORE DESIRABLE OF THE TWO.

5. ENERGY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIALOGUE: IN ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF HOW TO GUIDE INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIALOGUE, THE COMMISSION  
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FIRST PROPOSES A SYSTEM OF EC-ARAB "CONSULTATIONS" ON

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SOE-02 /123 W

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R 142000Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7891  
INFO ALL EC CAPITALS  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
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DEVELOPMENTS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE RELEVANT SECTORS, E.G.,  
REFINERY CAPACITY, PETROCHEMICALS, STEEL, ETC. THESE  
CONSULTATIONS WOULD LEAD TO "ECONOMIC FORECASTS" FOR USE  
BY OFFICIAL PLANNERS IN THE MEMBER COUNTRIES ON EACH SIDE  
OF THE DIALOGUE. SIMILAR CONSULTATIONS ARE FORESEEN ON  
BROAD ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND QUESTIONS, THUS CONTINUING, IN  
EFFECT, THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BEGUN SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN  
THE ENERGY COMMITTEE OF CIEC (NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE). THE  
DOCUMENT CAUTIONS THAT THIS POLICY MUST BE PRESENTED  
"PRUDENTLY," I.E., TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE "SENSITIVITIES"  
OF OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED OIL CONSUMERS, E.G., THE U.S. AND  
JAPAN. THE COMMISSION SERVICES' VIEW IS THAT THE SUG-  
GESTED FORMULA (I.E., EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION THROUGH  
MUTUAL CONSULTATION) SHOULD ENABLE THE COMMUNITY TO AVOID  
THE LABEL OF "DEMANDEUR" ON OIL. SECOND, THE DOCUMENT  
ARGUES THAT ACCESS TO EC-NINE MARKETS THROUGH PREFERENTIAL  
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TREATMENT OF ARAB EXPORTS (BEGINNING ABOUT 1982-85) COULD  
POSSIBLY BE LINKED TO "VALID" ASSURANCES FROM THE ARAB  
SIDE ON SUPPLY OF CRUDE TO EUROPE. SUCH A STRATEGY COULD

BE IMPLEMENTED BY A EURO-ARAB "INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION POLICY," INCLUDING: (A) LONG-TERM SUPPLY CONTRACTS; AND (B) JOINT EURO-ARAB COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT VENTURES.

6. COMMENT. GIVEN THE GERMAN EC PRESIDENCY'S APPARENT INTEREST IN ACCORDING EURO-ARAB RELATIONS HIGHER PRIORITY (BRUSSELS 13143), IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT THE PURPOSE AND FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE WILL BECOME AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF COMMISSION AND EC MEMBER STATE DEBATE IN THE MONTHS JUST AHEAD. HOWEVER, IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO PREDICT TO WHAT EXTENT FOREGOING COMMISSION STAFF IDEAS WILL RECEIVE GENERAL ENDORSEMENT. BECAUSE OF THE MANY COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE EC, WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THE MORE RADICAL INNOVATIONS BEING PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION STAFF -- E.G., THOSE RELATING TO RESTRUCTURING THE EC'S REFINING INDUSTRY OR GRANTING THE ARAB STATES A GUARANTEED, PREFERENTIAL MARKET FOR REFINED PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS -- WILL GET OFF THE GROUND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE, ENERGY, AND POLITICAL INTERESTS OF SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY, MISSION WILL USE ALL AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO REINFORCE THE INSTINCTS OF THOSE IN THE COMMISSION (E.G., HAFERKAMP, DAVIGNON, AND THEIR ASSOCIATES) AND AMONG THE PERM REPS WHO ARE AGAINST BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE IN THIS WAY. THE AMBASSADOR USED HIS JULY 13 FAREWELL DINNER FOR DOE REP TO ASK COMMISSION ENERGY DIRECTOR GENERAL WILLIAMS, WHO IS KNOWN TO BE CONCERNED OVER EXISTING EXCESS REFINERY CAPACITY IN EUROPE, IF HE SUPPORTED IDEA OF PREFERENTIAL PRODUCTION.

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UCT ACCESS FOR ARABS. WILLIAMS' REPLY, A RESOUNDING "NO," IS ENCOURAGING BUT HARDLY DEFINITIVE. THIS QUESTION MERITS CONTINUING CLOSE ATTENTION. HINTON

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## Message Attributes

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Sheryl P. Walter  
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